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1 Introduction
We live in a world of globalization. International trade and foreign direct investment
(FDI) are among the fastest growing economic activities. In the fast expansion of
merchandise trade, there has been an even faster growth of trade in intermediate
products. This phenomenon, closely related to the growing fragmentation of produc-
tion, has been investigated from various perspectives, such as \international vertical
specialization" (Yi 2003), \international production sharing" (Yeats 2001), and \out-
sourcing" (Helpman 2006). Helpman (2006) points out that \the growth of input
trade has taken place both within and across the boundaries of the rm, i.e., as in-
trarm and arms-length trade." The choice of organizational form by individual rms
when outsourcing naturally emerged: integration or non-integration.1
We follow the framework of property rights theory from Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) (hereinafter GHM). With incomplete contract,
which arises due to causes such as unforeseen contingencies and inability of enforce-
ment, relationship-specic investments are distorted by the hold-up problem and are
therefore insucient. In GHM, relationship-specic investments are simultaneously
invested. In contrast, based on Hart (1995), we construct a sequential hold-up model,
in which relationship-specic investments are sequentially invested, to investigate the
ineciency issue of underinvestment and individual rms' strategic choices of orga-
nizational forms when outsourcing their intermediate products.2
Our results indicate that as a result of the encouragement eect of sequential com-
plementary investment, sequential investment alleviates the underinvestment caused
by the hold-up problem. Thereafter, we analyze the impact of sequential invest-
ment on the choice of ownership structure. We show that contrary to the result of
the standard property rights theory, strictly complementary assets could be owned
separately.
More specically, when a nal good producer initiates the proposal of outsourcing
its intermediate products to some supplier, some relationship-specic pre-investments
from both sides are often involved, which is a double moral-hazard problem in terms
of Laont and Martimort (2002). The nal good producer chooses the optimal or-
ganizational form, which depends on the contractual environments and the specic
characteristics of the intermediate products. The nal good producer and the supplier
have to rely on bargaining to divide the surplus of investment through the ex post
renegotiation, since ex ante contracts are incomplete. With sequential investment,
1Helpman (2006), \... outsourcing means the acquisition of an intermediate input or service from
an unaliated supplier, while integration means production of the intermediate input or service
within the boundary of the rm."
2When a nal good producer outsources its intermediate products to some supplier, relationship
specic investments naturally occur sequentially. For instance, the nal good producer may initiate
the design and development, followed by the supplier's eort in acquiring raw materials.
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the nal good producer may have incentive to invest more to elicit more investment
from the supplier. Therefore, it may be even better to give the nal good producer
more residual rights of control.
Our model is close to Noldeke and Schmidt (1998)'s sequential investment model.3
They show that the underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem still exists un-
der the sequential investment setting.4 But they proceed upon neither the possible
alleviation of underinvestment nor the consequent impact of sequential investment on
the choice of ownership structure.5
Our model is also related to the literature on hold-up (see the survey of Che
and Sakovics 2008). They mainly focus on the ineciency issue due to the hold-up
problem and organizational or contract remedies to achieve the rst best through
some ex post renegotiation design. Che and Hausch (1999) argue that it is some-
what arbitrary to assign some party the entire ex post bargaining power under the
incomplete contracting environment.6 The restriction of the \selsh"7 nature of the
relationship-specic investments also limits the ecient results in the current liter-
ature. Further, Che and Hausch show that if relationship-specic investments are
\cooperative" and parties can not commit not to renegotiate, all feasible contracts
are worthless. In contrast, our model assumes relationship-specic investments are
sequentially invested and \cooperative". We focus on the impact of sequential invest-
ment on ineciency issue of underinvestment and individual rms' strategic choices
of organizational forms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the setup of
a modied Hart (1995) property rights theory model and shows that sequential in-
vestment alleviates the underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem. Section 3
investigates the impact of sequential investment on the choice of ownership structure.
Section 4 concludes.
3They assume if trade does not occur, the party not controlling the assets gets nothing. In our
model, we follow Hart (1995) assuming more general non-trade payos, which allow the payo of the
party not controlling the assets to depend on both the ownership structure and its own investment.
4They show that under some specic assumptions option-to-own contracts achieve the rst-best
with sequential investment decisions.
5Smirnov and Wait (2004) provide a model to allow the exibility in the timing of investment
and show that the overall welfare may be detrimental due to the cost of delay. In their alter-
native investment regime (sequential investment), renegotiation occurs after the leader makes the
relationship-specic investment. In contrast, in Noldeke and Schmidt (1998) and our model, the
timing of investment is exogenously given and contracting is impossible on both relationship-specic
investments. Consequently, renegotiation will only occur after both relationship-specic investments
are sunk. Further, Smirnov and Wait (2004) assume the outside options for both parties are zero
and there is no role of ownership structure.
6In our model, the ex post bargaining power is endogenously determined by the strategic choices
of organizational forms of individual rms.
7\Selsh" refers to one party's relationship-specic investment has no direct externalities to other
parties.
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2 The Model
Follow the setup of Hart (1995). There is a nal good producer M1 and a supplier
M2. There are two physical assets, a1 and a2, which are associated to M1 and M2
respectively. At date t = 1, they agree on the ownership structure, i.e., who owns
the rm. No further contractual arrangement is possible at this stage. Then, at
date t = 1:1, M1 invests the relationship-specic investment i; at date t = 1:2, M2
invests the relationship-specic investment e. C1(i) and C2(e) represent the cost of the
investments. Finally, at date t = 2, M1 and M2 renegotiate. If there is an agreement
on the price of the intermediate products, intermediate products are produced, and
payment and transfer are proceeded. Otherwise, if the renegotiation breaks down,
they will stay with their own non-trade payos. The timing of the model is illustrated
in Figure 1.
M1 & M2 
negotiation of 
the ownership 
structure
Investment
from M1 
Investment
from M2
1 1.1 1.2 2 t
M1 & M2 renegotiation, 
intermediate products 
produced, payment and 
transfer
Figure 1: Timing
Let A represent the assets that M1 owns and B represent the assets that M2
owns. Therefore, (A;B) represents the ownership structure, where A
T
B = ; and
A
S
B = fa1; a2g. The ownership structure could be one of the following:
 Non-integration: M1 owns a1 and M2 owns a2, (A;B) = (fa1g; fa2g)
 Type 1 integration: M1 owns a1 and a2, (A;B) = (fa1; a2g; ;)
 Type 2 integration: M2 owns a1 and a2, (A;B) = (;; fa1; a2g)
If trade occurs, the ex post surplus is R(i; e).8 If trade does not occur, the non-
trade payos for M1 and M2 are r1(i;A) and r2(e;B) respectively. We make the
following assumptions for any ownership structure (A;B).
Assumption 1 R(i; e), r1(i;A), and r2(e;B) are strictly concave for any ownership
structure (A;B); C1(i) and C2(e) are strictly convex.
8In Hart (1995), the ex post surplus function is separable in relationship-specic investments,
which implies that specic investments are \selsh", in terms of Che and Hausch (1999). Due to this
reason, the equilibrium result under sequential investment is equivalent to that under simultaneous
investment.
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Assumption 2 R(i; e)  r1(i;A) + r2(e;B)
Assumption 3
@R(i; e)
@i
 dr1(i; fa1; a2g)
di
 dr1(i; fa1g)
di
 dr1(i; ;)
di
@R(i; e)
@e
 dr2(e; fa1; a2g)
de
 dr2(e; fa2g)
de
 dr2(e; ;)
de
Assumption 4
@2R(i; e)
@i@e
 0
Assumption 1 is the usual assumption of the surplus functions and cost functions.
Assumption 2 captures the idea that i and e are relationship-specic investments.
Assumption 3 says that relationship-specicity also applies in a marginal sense, which
is similar to Hart (1995).9 Assumption 4 says that investments are complementary
at the margin.
Let  represent the ex post bargaining weight of M1, where  2 [0; 1]. The ex
post payo of M1 and M2 are
1(i; e;A;B) = r1(i;A) + [R(i; e)  (r1(i;A) + r2(e;B))]
2(i; e;A;B) = r2(e;B) + (1  )[R(i; e)  (r1(i;A) + r2(e;B))]
(1)
2.1 The First-Best
In the rst-best, M1 and M2 maximize the date 1 present value of their trading
relationship, the ex ante surplus S(i; e).
max
i;e
S(i; e) = R(i; e)  C1(i)  C2(e)
The rst order conditions are (
@R(i;e)
@i
= C
0
1(i)
@R(i;e)
@e
= C
0
2(e)
Let (i; e) denote the solution of the maximization problem above.
9\... the marginal return from each investment is greater the more assets in the relationship,
human and otherwise, to which the person making the investment has access."
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2.2 Simultaneous Investment (Un-observable Investment)
In the case thatM2 cannot observe the investment i fromM1 before his investment e,
the solution is equivalent to that under simultaneous investment. Given the ownership
structure (A;B) agreed at date 1, M1 and M2 choose i and e non-cooperatively at
date 1:1 and 1:2. From equation 1, they maximize their own payos, net of investment
costs.
max
i
1(i; e;A;B)  C1(i) = r1(i;A) + [R(i; e)  (r1(i;A) + r2(e;B))]  C1(i)
max
e
2(i; e;A;B)  C2(e) = r2(e;B) + (1  )[R(i; e)  (r1(i;A) + r2(e;B))]  C2(e)
The rst order conditions are(
@R(i;e)
@i
+ (1  )dr1(i;A)
di
= C
0
1(i)
(1  )@R(i;e)
@e
+ dr2(e;B)
de
= C
0
2(e)
Suppose (i(A;B); e(A;B)) satises the rst order conditions above under ownership
structure (A;B).
The following proposition shows that under simultaneous investment, there is un-
derinvestment in relationship-specic investments due to the hold-up problem, which
is similar to the result of the property rights theory from GHM.
Proposition 1 Under simultaneous investment, i(A;B)  i and e(A;B)  e,
8(A;B).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The response functions and the equilibrium investment pairs under simultaneous
investment and at the rst best are illustrated in Figure 2. Here, i(e) is the response
function of i with respect to e under the rst best; e(i) is the response function of
e with respect to i under the rst best; i(e;A;B) is the response function of i with
respect to e under the simultaneous investment with ownership structure (A;B);
e(i;A;B) is the response function of e with respect to i under the simultaneous
investment with ownership structure (A;B).
Following the notation of Hart (1995), the equilibrium investment pairs under
simultaneous investment (i(A;B); e(A;B)) is denoted by (i0; e0), (i1; e1), and (i2; e2)
for non-integration, type 1 integration, and type 2 integration respectively. In Hart
(1995), relationship-specic investments are \selsh". Therefore, he has the following
results: compared with non-integration, type 1 integration raises M1's investment,
but lowers M2's; compared with non-integration, type 2 integration raises M2's in-
vestment, but lowers M1's.10
10See page 42 in Hart (1995): i1  i0  i2; e2  e0  e1.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Investment Pairs under Simultaneous Investment
In contrast, since relationship-specic investments are complementary in our model,
we do not have a clear picture of investment level if the organizational form shifts from
one type of ownership structure to another. To illustrate, Figure 3 depicts the re-
sponse functions and the equilibrium investment pairs under simultaneous investment
with non-integration.11
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Investment Pairs under Simultaneous Investment
with Various Types of Ownership Structure
If the organizational form shifts from non-integration to type 1 integration, the
equilibrium investment pairs will reach some point in the shaded area to the \up-
per left" of (e0; i0), which is bounded below by i0(e) and right by e0(i). Therefore,
compared with non-integration, type 1 integration does not necessarily raise M1's
11Here, i0(e)  i(e; fa1g; fa2g); e0(i)  e(i; fa1g; fa2g).
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investment while lower M2's. Similarly, if the organizational form shifts from non-
integration to type 2 integration, the equilibrium investment pairs will reach some
point in the shaded area to the \lower right" of (e0; i0), which is bounded above by
i0(e) and left by e0(i). Therefore, compared with non-integration, type 2 integration
does not necessarily raise M2's investment while lower M1's.
2.3 Sequential Investment
Suppose M2 can observe the investment i from M1 before his investment. Given the
ownership structure (A;B) agreed at date 1,M1 chooses i at date 1:1. After observing
M1's investment, M2 chooses e at date 1:2. From equation 1, they maximize their
own payos, net of investment costs.
With backward induction, at date 1:2, M2 chooses e given M1's choice i at date
1:1.
max
e
2(i; e;A;B)  C2(e) = r2(e;B) + (1  )[R(i; e)  (r1(i;A) + r2(e;B))]  C2(e)
s.t. i is some given constant
The rst order condition is
(1  )@R(i; e)
@e
+ 
dr2(e;B)
de
= C
0
2(e) (2)
From the rst order condition above, we get the response function of M2 under
ownership structure (A;B).
e = e(i;A;B)
At date 1:1, M1 chooses i given the response function of M2 above.
max
i
1(i; e;A;B) C1(i) = r1(i;A) + [R(i; e)  (r1(i;A) + r2(e;B))]  C1(i)
s.t. e = e(i;A;B)
The rst order condition is

@R(i; e)
@i
+ (1  )dr1(i;A)
di
+ 

@R(i; e)
@e
  dr2(e;B)
de

de
di
= C
0
1(i) (3)
Suppose (i(A;B); e(A;B)) satises the rst order condition above and the response
function e(i;A;B) of M2 under ownership structure (A;B).
The following proposition shows that under sequential investment, underinvest-
ment of the relationship-specic investment is alleviated. Since relationship-specic
investments are complementary, the rst mover has incentive to invest more to en-
courage the follower to catch up. We call this encouragement eect.
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Proposition 2 Sequential investment alleviates the underinvestment caused by the
hold-up problem, i.e. i(A;B)  i(A;B) and e(A;B)  e(A;B), 8(A;B).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The response functions and the equilibrium investment pairs under sequential in-
vestment, under simultaneous investment, and at the rst best are illustrated in Fig-
ure 4. Here, i(e;A;B) is the response function of i with respect to e under the sequen-
tial investment with ownership structure (A;B); e(i;A;B) is the response function of
e with respect to i under the sequential investment with ownership structure (A;B).
With sequential investment, M2's response function remains unchanged, while M1's
response function is shifting up. Therefore, the equilibrium investment pairs will
reach some point on M2's response function curve and above (e(A;B); i(A;B)) (the
bold portion of e(i;A;B) in Figure 4). Clearly, both investment levels will increase
with sequential investment. But there are possibilities of overinvestment for both i
and e.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Investment Pairs under Sequential Investment
Following the notation of Hart (1995), the equilibrium investment pairs under
sequential investment (i(A;B); e(A;B)) is denoted by (i0; e0), (i1; e1), and (i2; e2) for
non-integration, type 1 integration, and type 2 integration respectively. Similar to the
result in the case of simultaneous investment, since relationship-specic investments
are complementary in our model, we do not have a clear picture of investment level
if the organizational form shifts from one type of ownership structure to another.
To illustrate, Figure 5 depicts the response functions and the equilibrium investment
pairs under sequential investment with non-integration.12
If the organizational form shifts from non-integration to type 1 integration, the
equilibrium investment pairs will reach some point in the shaded area to the \up-
12Here, i0(e)  i(e; fa1g; fa2g); e0(i)  e(i; fa1g; fa2g).
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Investment Pairs under Sequential Investment
with Various Types of Ownership Structure
per left" of (e0; i0), which is bounded below by i0(e) and right by e0(i). Therefore,
compared with non-integration, type 1 integration does not necessarily raise M1's
investment while lower M2's. Similarly, if the organizational form shifts from non-
integration to type 1 integration, the equilibrium investment pairs will reach some
point in the shaded area to the \lower right" of (e0; i0), which is bounded above by
i0(e) and left by e0(i). Therefore, compared with non-integration, type 2 integration
does not necessarily raise M2's investment while lower M1's.13
2.4 Welfare Analysis
In proposition 2, we show that due to the encouragement eect there will be more
investments under sequential investment given any ownership structure (A;B). The
further question is whether more investments are better, or if the ex ante surplus
S(i; e) = R(i; e)   C1(i)   C2(e) is increasing as i and e increase under sequential
investment.
Let S0 = R(i0; e0)   C1(i0)   C2(e0); S1 = R(i1; e1)   C1(i1)   C2(e1); S2 =
R(i2; e2)   C1(i2)   C2(e2). And S0 = R(i0; e0)   C1(i0)   C2(e0); S1 = R(i1; e1)  
C1(i1)   C2(e1); S2 = R(i2; e2)   C1(i2)   C2(e2). In addition, the ex ante surplus
S(i; e) under the rst best S = R(i; e)  C1(i)  C2(e).
As in Figure 4, i and e will increase with sequential investment. But there are
possibilities of overinvestment for both i and e. We say i is conditionally under-
invested given e, if @R(i;e)
@i
> C
0
1(i); i is conditionally optimally invested given
13Under sequential investment the equilibrium investment pairs in type 1 integration is not
bounded above by i(e), whereas under simultaneous investment the equilibrium investment pairs
in type 1 integration is bounded above by i(e).
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e, if @R(i;e)
@i
= C
0
1(i); i is conditionally overinvested given e, if
@R(i;e)
@i
< C
0
1(i).
Similarly, e is conditionally underinvested given i, if @R(i;e)
@e
> C
0
2(e); e is conditionally
optimally invested given i, if @R(i;e)
@e
= C
0
2(e); e is conditionally overinvested given i,
if @R(i;e)
@e
< C
0
2(e).
From the rst order conditions under simultaneous investment in section 2.2 and
the rst order conditions under sequential investment in section 2.3, we know that e
is either conditionally underinvested given i or conditionally optimally invested given
i under both simultaneous and sequential investment. Similarly, under simultaneous
investment, i is either conditionally underinvested given e or conditionally optimally
invested given e. But under sequential investment, i could be conditionally overin-
vested given e, if @R(i;e)
@i
< C
0
1(i).
The following lemma shows that if i is conditionally underinvested given e or
conditionally optimally invested given e, S(i; e) increases as i and e increase. Even
if i is conditionally overinvested given e, S(i; e) still increases as i and e increase
provided that the encouragement eect is suciently large; only if encouragement
eect is small enough, does S(i; e) decrease as i and e increase.
Lemma 1 i) If @R(i;e)
@i
 C 01(i), S(i; e) increases as i and e increase.
ii) If @R(i;e)
@i
< C
0
1(i) and
de
di
  
@R(i;e)
@i
 C01(i)
@R(i;e)
@e
 C02(e)
, S(i; e) increases as i and e increase.
iii) If @R(i;e)
@i
< C
0
1(i) and
de
di
<  
@R(i;e)
@i
 C01(i)
@R(i;e)
@e
 C02(e)
, S(i; e) decreases as i and e increase.
Proof. See the Appendix.
From Lemma 1 and the rst order conditions under sequential investment in sec-
tion 2.3, the following proposition shows that sequential investment will be better
than simultaneous investment in terms of larger ex ante surplus S(i; e).
Proposition 3
S0  S0; S1  S1; S2  S2
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, under sequential investment, since the relationship-specic investments
are complementary, M1 has incentive to invest more to elicit more investment from
the follower M2. Therefore, i could be conditionally overinvested given e. But M1
can only capture partial of the benet from his own investment i. In addition, e is
either conditionally underinvested given i or conditionally optimally invested given i.
Consequently, the overinvestment eect, if it exists, is dominated by the encourage-
ment eect.
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3 Choices of Ownership Structure
Now, we turn to determine which ownership structure is optimal. The logic is that at
date 1, before investing the relationship-specic investments, M1 and M2 negotiate
the ownership structure. They will choose the one maximizing the ex ante surplus
S(i; e) = R(i; e)   C1(i)   C2(e) given that lump-sum transfers are possible at date
1. Under simultaneous investment, M1 and M2 choose the ownership structure that
maxfS0; S1; S2g; under sequential investment, M1 and M2 choose the ownership
structure that maxfS0; S1; S2g.
From proposition 3, since the encouragement eect dominates the overinvestment
eect, rms are always better o shifting from simultaneous investment to sequential
investment. I.e., maxfS0; S1; S2g  maxfS0; S1; S2g. The question now is which
ownership structure is the best under simultaneous investment and sequential invest-
ment respectively.14
Similar to Hart (1995), we introduce the following denitions.
Denition 1 M1's investment decision is said to be inelastic if M1 chooses the
same level of i, say bi, in any ownership structure; M2's investment decision is said
to be inelastic if M2 chooses the same level of e, say be, in any ownership structure.
Denition 2 M1's investment is said to become relatively unproductive if R(i; e)
is replaced with R(i; e) + (1   )C1(i) + (1   )R(i; e)ji=0, and r1(i;A) is replaced
with r1(i;A)+(1  )C1(i), where  > 0 is small; M2's investment is said to become
relatively unproductive if R(i; e) is replaced with R(i; e) + (1   )C2(e) + (1  
)R(i; e)je=0, and r2(e;B) is replaced with r2(e;B) + (1   )C2(e), where  > 0 is
small.
Denition 3 Assets a1 and a2 are independent if dr1(i;fa1;a2g)
di
 dr1(i;fa1g)
di
and
dr2(e;fa1;a2g)
de
 dr2(e;fa2g)
de
.
Denition 4 Assets a1 and a2 are strictly complementary if either dr1(i;fa1g)
di

dr1(i;;)
di
or dr2(e;fa2g)
de
 dr2(e;;)
de
.
Denition 5 M1's investment i is essential if dr2(e;fa1;a2g)
de
 dr1(i;fa1g)
di
 dr2(e;;)
de
;
M2's investment e is essential if dr1(i;fa1;a2g)
di
 dr2(e;fa2g)
de
 dr1(i;;)
di
.15
14We say that some ownership structure is optimal if it weakly dominates all other ownership
structures with the largest ex ante surplus.
15If either i or e is essential, then from denition 4, a1 and a2 are strictly complementary. If both
i and e are essential, then from denition 3, a1 and a2 are independent.
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The following proposition employs the denitions above.
Proposition 4 Table 1 characterizes the optimal ownership structures under simul-
taneous investment and sequential investment respectively.
Table 1: Optimal Choice of Ownership Structures
Simultaneous Investment Sequential Investment
(i)
If i is inelastic type 2 integration type 2 integration
If e is inelastic type 1 integration type 1 integration
(ii)
If i is relatively
unproductive
type 2 integration type 2 integration
If e is relatively
unproductive
type 1 integration type 1 integration
(iii)
If assets a1 and
a2 are indepen-
dent
non-integration non-integration or type
1 integration
(iv)
If assets a1 and
a2 are strictly
complementary
type 1 integration or type 2
integration
non-integration could be
optimal
(v)
If i is essential type 1 integration type 1 integration
If e is essential type 2 integration all ownership structures
could be optimal
If both i and e
are essential
all ownership structures are
equally good
all ownership structures are
equally good
(vi)
If  is close to 0 type 1 integration type 1 integration
If  is close to 1 type 2 integration type 2 integration
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proposition above is intuitive. Part (i) says that there is no way to assign
ownership to the party whose investment decision is not responsive to incentives. Part
(ii) says that there is no way to assign ownership to the party whose investment is
unimportant. And these apply to both the simultaneous and sequential investment
cases.
Part (iii) says that under simultaneous investment, if access to a1 does not increase
M2's marginal return from e given he already has access to a2, then S(i; e) will
decrease as the organizational form shifts from non-integration to type 2 integration.
The reason is that while the transfer of control over a1 from M1 to M2 has no eect
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on M2's marginal investment return from e, it may have a signicantly negative
eect on M1's marginal investment return from i. Similarly, if access to a2 does
not increase M1's marginal return from i given he already has access to a1, then
S(i; e) will decrease as the organizational form shifts from non-integration to type 1
integration. Therefore, under simultaneous investment when assets are independent,
both forms of integration are dominated by non-integration.
Under sequential investment, the argument above also applies when the organi-
zational form shifts from non-integration to type 2 integration, as there is neither
change of M2's marginal investment return from e nor the encouragement eect.
However, when the organizational form shifts from non-integration to type 1 inte-
gration, M2's marginal investment return from e decreases. Meanwhile, instead of
remaining unchanged under simultaneous investment, M1's marginal return from i
could increase due to the encouragement eect, even if access to a2 does not increase
M1's marginal return from i given he already has access to a1. Therefore, we can
not say that non-integration dominates type 1 integration. I.e., both non-integration
and type 1 integration could be optimal under sequential investment when assets are
independent.
Part (iv) says that under simultaneous investment, if access to a2 alone has no
eect onM2's marginal return from e (M2 needs a1 as well), then S(i; e) will increase
as the organizational form shifts from non-integration to type 1 integration. The
reason is that while the transfer of control over a2 from M2 to M1 increases M1's
marginal investment return from i, it has no eect on M2's marginal investment
return from e. Similarly, if access to a1 alone has no eect on M1's marginal return
from i (M1 needs a2 as well), then S(i; e) will increase as the organizational form
shifts from non-integration to type 2 integration. Therefore, under simultaneous
investment when the assets are strictly complementary, non-integration is dominated
either by type 1 or type 2 integration.
Under sequential investment, if access to a2 alone has no eect on M2's marginal
return from e (M2 needs a1 as well), the argument above also applies when the orga-
nizational form shifts from non-integration to type 1 integration, as there is neither
change of M2's marginal investment return from e, nor the encouragement eect.
However, if access to a1 alone has no eect on M1's marginal return from i (M1
needs a2 as well), when the organizational form shifts from non-integration to type
2 integration, M2's marginal investment return from e will increase. Meanwhile, in-
stead of remaining unchanged under simultaneous investment, M1's marginal return
from i could decrease due to the encouragement eect, even if access to a1 alone
has no eect on M1's marginal return from i. Therefore, we can not say that non-
integration is dominated by type 2 integration. I.e., strictly complementary assets
could be owned separately.
Part (v) says that under simultaneous investment, if M2's marginal return from e
is not enhanced by the presence of a1 and a2 in the absence of i, the asset transfer from
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M2 toM1 has no eect onM2's investment incentive. ButM1's investment incentive
increases. Therefore, it is better to give all the control rights to M1. Similarly, if
M1's marginal return from i is not enhanced by the presence of a1 and a2 in the
absence of e, it is better to give all the control rights to M2.
Under sequential investment, if M2's marginal return from e is not enhanced by
the presence of a1 and a2 in the absence of i, the argument above also applies when
the organizational form shifts to type 1 integration, as there is neither change of
M2's marginal investment return from e, nor the encouragement eect. However,
if M1's marginal return from i is not enhanced by the presence of a1 and a2 in the
absence of e, when the organizational form shifts to type 2 integration,M2's marginal
investment return from e will increase. Meanwhile, instead of remaining unchanged
under simultaneous investment, M1's marginal return from i could decrease due to
the encouragement eect. Therefore, we can not say that non-integration or type 1
integration is dominated by type 2 integration. I.e., all ownership structures could
be optimal under sequential investment even if e is essential.
If both i and e are essential,M1's marginal return from i andM2's marginal return
from e will remain the same for all ownership structures. It is straightforward that
all ownership structures are equally good for both the simultaneous and sequential
investment cases.
Part (vi) says that if M1 has a larger share of the ex post bargaining power, it
is better to let M2 have all the control rights. The reason is that in this case M1's
investment is close to conditionally optimal level. What we need to do is to maximize
the investment elicited fromM2. Therefore, to balance the ex post bargaining power,
M2 should have all the control rights. Similarly, if M2 has a larger share of the ex
post bargaining power, M1 should have all the control rights. And these apply to
both the simultaneous and sequential investment cases.
3.1 Some Applications to Outsourcing
From proposition 4, we have the following corollaries applying to outsourcing: a nal
good producer outsources its intermediate products to some supplier. Here, the nal
good producer is M1 and the supplier is M2 in our theoretic model.
Corollary 1 Type 1 integration could be the optimal ownership structure, even if the
assets are independent.
Corollary 1 is based on part (iii) of proposition 4, which might help explain that
the nal good producer may have incentive to acquire \irrelevant" assets from the
supplier when outsourcing.
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Corollary 2 Non-integration could be the optimal ownership structure, even if the
assets are strictly complementary for the nal good producer.
Corollary 2 is based on part (iv) of proposition 4, which might help explain that
strictly complementary assets could be owned separately when outsourcing.
Corollary 3 Type 2 integration may NOT be the optimal ownership structure, even
if the investment from the supplier is essential.
Corollary 3 is based on part (v) of proposition 4, which might help explain that the
nal good producer may have incentive to control some assets even if the supplier's
investment is \critical" when outsourcing.
Corollary 4 If one party has a larger share of the ex post bargaining power, it is
better to let the other party have all the control rights.
Corollary 4 is based on part (vi) of proposition 4, which might help explain that
the \weaker" party during the renegotiation stage may be better to assign all the
control rights at the negotiation stage.
4 Conclusion
Our sequential investment model provides a new scope to understand individual rms
strategic choices of organizational forms involving in the growing international divi-
sion of labor and specialization. With sequential investment, the nal good producer
may have incentive to invest more to elicit more investment from the supplier. And
thus, it may be better to give the nal good producer more residual rights of control.
This may help explain why strictly complementary assets could be owned separately
when outsourcing.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Let x = (i; e). Similar to the proof of proposition 1 in Hart
and Moore (1990), dene g(x) = R(i; e)  C1(i)  C2(e) and h(x;A;B) such that
rg(x) =
 
@R(i;e)
@i   C
0
1(i)
@R(i;e)
@e   C
0
2(e)
!
rh(x;A;B) =
 
@R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;A)di   C
0
1(i)
(1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;B)de   C
0
2(e)
!
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From the rst order conditions in section 2.1 and 2.2, we have
rg(x)
x=(i;e)= 0
rh(x;A;B)
x=(i(A;B);e(A;B))
= 0
From assumption 3, we have rg(x)  rh(x;A;B) for any ownership structure (A;B)
and investments i; e. Dene f(x; ) = g(x) + (1   )h(x;A;B). Also dene x() =
(i(); e()) to solve rf(x; ) = 0. Total dierentiating, we obtain
H(x; )dx() =  [rg(x) rh(x;A;B)]d
where H(x; ) is the Hessian of f(x; ) with respect to x. From assumption 1 and 4,
H(x; ) is negative denite. Also, from assumption 4, the o-diagonal elements of H(x; )
are non-negative. From Takayama (1985), p.393, theorem 4.D.3 [III"] and [IV"], H(x; ) 1
is nonpositive. Therefore, dx()=d  0, and x(1)  x(0), which implies i(A;B)  i and
e(A;B)  e.
Proof of Proposition 2 With backward induction, at date 1:2, M2 maximizes his
own payos, net of investment costs, by choosing e given M1's choice i at date 1:1. Total
dierentiating the rst order condition (equation 2), we obtain
(1  )@
2R(i; e)
@e2
de+ (1  )@
2R(i; e)
@e@i
di+ 
d2r2(e;B)
de2
de = C
00
2 (e)de
Rearranging and from assumption 1 and 4, we have
de
di
=
(1  )@2R(i;e)@e@i
C
00
2 (e)  (1  )@
2R(i;e)
@e2
  d2r2(e;B)
de2
 0
Similar to the proof of proposition 1, let x = (i; e). From equation 2 and 3, dene
h(x;A;B) and l(x;A;B) such that
rh(x;A;B) =
 
@R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;A)di   C
0
1(i)
(1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;B)de   C
0
2(e)
!
rl(x;A;B) =
 
@R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;A)di + 
h
@R(i;e)
@e   dr2(e;B)de
i
de
di   C
0
1(i)
(1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;B)de   C
0
2(e)
!
From the rst order conditions in section 2.2 and 2.3, we have
rh(x;A;B)
x=(i(A;B);e(A;B))
= 0
rl(x;A;B)
x=(i(A;B);e(A;B))
= 0
From assumption 3 and de(i;A;B)di  0, we have rl(x;A;B)  rh(x;A;B) for any own-
ership structure (A;B) and investments i; e. The remaining is the same as the proof of
proposition 1. We have i(A;B)  i(A;B) and e(A;B)  e(A;B).
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Proof of Lemma 1 From proposition 2, given any ownership structure (A;B) there will
be more investments under sequential investment. Total dierentiating the ex ante surplus
S(i; e) = R(i; e)  C1(i)  C2(e),
dS(i; e) =

@R(i; e)
@i
  C 01(i)

di+

@R(i; e)
@e
  C 02(e)

de
We know e is either conditionally underinvested given i or conditionally optimally in-
vested given i, @R(i;e)@e  C
0
2(e). Clearly, from the equation above, if i is also conditionally
underinvested or conditionally optimally invested, @R(i;e)@i  C
0
1(i), then S(i; e) will increase
as i and e increase.
Instead, if i is conditionally overinvested, i.e. @R(i;e)@i < C
0
1(i), to let S(i; e) increase as i
and e increase, from the equation above, we must have
de
di
  
@R(i;e)
@i   C
0
1(i)
@R(i;e)
@e   C
0
2(e)
Proof of Proposition 3 From the rst order conditions under sequential investment
in section 2.3, rearrange equation 2


@R(i; e)
@e
  dr2(e;B)
de

=
@R(i; e)
@e
  C 02(e)
Plug into equation 3 and rearrange.
de
di
=  
@R(i;e)
@i + (1  )dr1(i;A)di   C
0
1(i)

h
@R(i;e)
@e   dr2(e;B)de
i    @R(i;e)@i   C 01(i)
@R(i;e)
@e   C
0
2(e)
where @R(i;e)@i  dr1(i;A)di from assumption 3.
According to proposition 2 and lemma 1, we have i(A;B)  i(A;B) and e(A;B) 
e(A;B) for all (A;B), which implies S0  S0, S1  S1, and S2  S2.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Suppose M1's investment decision is inelastic. M1 sets i = bi for all ownership
structures. Under simultaneous investment, from the rst order conditions in section 2.2
and assumption 3, clearly to elicit more investment from M2, it is better to give all the
control rights to M2. Conversely, if M2's investment decision is inelastic, it is better to
give all the control rights to M1. Under sequential investment, the argument above also
applies.
(ii) Suppose M1's investment is relatively unproductive. Under simultaneous invest-
ment, M2's rst order condition becomes:



@R(i; e)
@i
+ (1  )C 01(i)

+ (1  )


dr1(i;A)
di
+ (1  )C 01(i)

= C
0
2(e)
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which simplies to

@R(i; e)
@i
+ (1  )dr1(i;A)
di
= C
0
1(i)
In other words, M1's investment i and  are independent. However, ex ante surplus
S(i; e) = R(i; e) + (1  )C1(i) + (1  )R(i; e)ji=0   C1(i)  C2(e)
! R(i; e)ji=0   C2(e) as  ! 0
Therefore, for  small, what matters is M2's investment decision. It is optimal to give all
the control rights to M2. The same argument shows that if M2's investment is relatively
unproductive, M1 should have all the control rights.
Under sequential investment, the argument above also applies if M2's investment is
relatively unproductive.
However, under sequential investment, the story changes a little if M1's investment
is relatively unproductive due to the encouragement eect. In this case, M1's rst order
condition becomes:



@R(i; e)
@i
+ (1  )C 01(i)

+ (1  )


dr1(e;A)
de
+ (1  )C 01(i)

+



@R(i; e)
@e
+ (1  )

@R(i; e)
@e

i=0

  dr2(e;B)
de

de
di
= C
0
1(i)
M2's rst order condition becomes:
(1  )


@R(i; e)
@e
+ (1  )

@R(i; e)
@e

i=0

+ 
dr2(e;B)
de
= C
0
2(e)
Rearrange and we have

@R(i; e)
@e
+ (1  )

@R(i; e)
@e

i=0

  dr2(e;B)
de
=
1
1  

C
0
2(e) 
dr2(e;B)
de

Total dierentiating M2's rst order condition, we obtain
(1  )@
2R(i; e)
@e2
de+ (1  )@
2R(i; e)
@e@i
di+ (1  )(1  )

@2R(i; e)
@e2

i=0

de+ 
d2r2(e;B)
de2
de = C
00
2 (e)de
Rearrange and we have
de
di
=
(1  ) @2R(i;e)@e@i
C
00
2 (e)  (1  ) @
2R(i;e)
@e2
  (1  )(1  )

@2R(i;e)
@e2

i=0

  d2r2(e;B)
de2
Plug into M1's rst order condition and rearrange.

@R(i; e)
@i
+ (1  )dr1(i;A)
di
+

h
C
0
2(e)  dr2(e;B)de
i
@2R(i;e)
@e@i
C
00
2 (e)  (1  ) @
2R(i;e)
@e2   (1  )(1  )

@2R(i;e)
@e2

i=0

  d2r2(e;B)de2
= C
0
1(i)
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In this case, M1's investment i and  are not independent and i is greater than the level
under simultaneous investment case. However, as  ! 0, ex ante surplus
S(i; e) = R(i; e) + (1  )C1(i) + (1  )R(i; e)ji=0   C1(i)  C2(e)
! R(i; e)ji=0   C2(e) as  ! 0
Therefore, for  small, what matters is M2's investment decision. It is optimal to give all
the control rights to M2.
(iii) Suppose assets a1 and a2 are independent. Under simultaneous investment, con-
sider the organizational form shifts from non-integration to type 2 integration. From as-
sumption 3, we have(
@R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;fa1g)di   C
0
1(i)  @R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;;)di   C
0
1(i)
(1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;fa2g)de   C
0
2(e) = (1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;fa1;a2g)de   C
0
2(e)
Similar to the proof of proposition 1, we have i0  i2; e0  e2. I.e., non-integration domi-
nates type 2 integration. The same argument shows that non-integration dominates type 1
integration.
Under sequential investment, consider the organizational form shifts from non-integration
to type 2 integration. From assumption 3, we have168>><>>:
@R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;fa1g)di + 
h
@R(i;e)
@e   dr2(e;fa2g)de
i
de
di   C
0
1(i) 
@R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;;)di + 
h
@R(i;e)
@e   dr2(e;fa2g)de
i
de
di   C
0
1(i)
(1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;fa2g)de   C
0
2(e) = (1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;fa1;a2g)de   C
0
2(e)
Similar to the proof of proposition 1, we have i0  i2; e0  e2. I.e., non-integration domi-
nates type 2 integration.
However, the story changes as we consider the organizational form shifts from non-
integration to type 1 integration. From assumption 3, from M2's rst order condition, we
have
(1  )@R(i; e)
@e
+ 
dr2(e; fa2g)
de
  C 02(e)  (1  )
@R(i; e)
@e
+ 
dr2(e; ;)
de
  C 02(e)
But from M1's rst order condition, it could be

@R(i; e)
@i
+ (1  )dr1(i; fa1g)
di
+ 

@R(i; e)
@e
  dr2(e; fa2g)
de

de
di
  C 01(i) <

@R(i; e)
@i
+ (1  )dr1(i; fa1; a2g)
di
+ 

@R(i; e)
@e
  dr2(e; ;)
de

de
di
  C 01(i)
Therefore, we can not say that non-integration dominates type 1 integration. I.e., both
non-integration and type 1 integration could be optimal under sequential investment.
16In this case, M2's rst order condition does not change when the organizational form shifts from
non-integration to type 2 integration. And therefore dedi does not change either.
20
(iv) Suppose assets a1 and a2 are strictly complementary: either dr1(i;fa1g)di  dr1(i;;)di
or dr2(e;fa2g)de  dr2(e;;)de . Under simultaneous investment, start with non-integration. From
assumption 3, either the organizational form shifts to type 1 integration we have(
@R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;fa1g)di   C
0
1(i)  @R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;fa1;a2g)di   C
0
1(i)
(1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;fa2g)de   C
0
2(e) = (1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;;)de   C
0
2(e)
or the organizational form shifts to type 2 integration we have(
@R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;fa1g)di   C
0
1(i) = 
@R(i;e)
@i + (1  )dr1(i;;)di   C
0
1(i)
(1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;fa2g)de   C
0
2(e)  (1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;fa1;a2g)de   C
0
2(e)
Similar to the proof of proposition 1, we have either i0  i1; e0  e1, or i0  i2; e0  e2.
I.e., non-integration is dominated either by type 1 or type 2 integration.
Under sequential investment, start with non-integration. From assumption 3, if dr2(e;fa2g)de 
dr2(e;;)
de , the organizational form shifts to type 1 integration we have8>><>>:
@R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;fa1g)di + 
h
@R(i;e)
@e   dr2(e;fa2g)de
i
de
di   C
0
1(i) 
@R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;fa1;a2g)di + 
h
@R(i;e)
@e   dr2(e;;)de
i
de
di   C
0
1(i)
(1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;fa2g)de   C
0
2(e) = (1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;;)de   C
0
2(e)
Similar to the proof of proposition 1, we have i0  i1; e0  e1. I.e., non-integration is
dominated by type 1 integration.
However, the story changes if dr1(i;fa1g)di  dr1(i;;)di . From assumption 3, from M2's rst
order condition, the organizational form shifts to type 2 integration we have
(1  )@R(i; e)
@e
+ 
dr2(e; fa2g)
de
  C 02(e)  (1  )
@R(i; e)
@e
+ 
dr2(e; fa1; a2g)
de
  C 02(e)
But from M1's rst order condition, it could be

@R(i; e)
@i
+ (1  )dr1(i; fa1g)
di
+ 

@R(i; e)
@e
  dr2(e; fa2g)
de

de
di
  C 01(i) >

@R(i; e)
@i
+ (1  )dr1(i; ;)
di
+ 

@R(i; e)
@e
  dr2(e; fa1; a2g)
de

de
di
  C 01(i)
Therefore, we can not say that non-integration is dominated by type 2 integration. I.e.,
strictly complementary assets could be owned separately under sequential investment.
(v) Suppose i is essential. Under simultaneous investment, consider the organizational
form shifts from type 2 integration or non-integration to type 1 integration. From assump-
tion 3, we have(
@R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;A)di   C
0
1(i)  @R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;fa1;a2g)di   C
0
1(i)
(1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;B)de   C
0
2(e) = (1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;;)de   C
0
2(e)
where (A;B) 2 f(fa1g; fa2g); (;; fa1; a2g)g. Similar to the proof of proposition 1, we have
i1  maxfi0; i2g; e1  maxfe0; e2g. I.e., type 1 integration dominates non-integration and
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type 2 integration. The same argument shows that type 2 integration dominates non-
integration and type 1 integration if e is essential.
Under sequential investment, if i is essential, consider the organizational form shifts
from type 2 integration or non-integration to type 1 integration. From assumption 3, we
have 8>><>>:
@R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;A)di + 
h
@R(i;e)
@e   dr2(e;B)de
i
de
di   C
0
1(i) 
@R(i;e)@i + (1  )dr1(i;fa1;a2g)di + 
h
@R(i;e)
@e   dr2(e;;)de
i
de
di   C
0
1(i)
(1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;B)de   C
0
2(e) = (1  )@R(i;e)@e + dr2(e;;)de   C
0
2(e)
where (A;B) 2 f(fa1g; fa2g); (;; fa1; a2g)g. Similar to the proof of proposition 1, we have
i1  maxfi0; i2g; e1  maxfe0; e2g. I.e., type 1 integration dominates non-integration and
type 2 integration.
However, the story changes if e is essential. Consider the organizational form shifts from
type 1 integration or non-integration to type 2 integration. From assumption 3, from M2's
rst order condition, we have
(1  )@R(i; e)
@e
+ 
dr2(e;B)
de
  C 02(e)  (1  )
@R(i; e)
@e
+ 
dr2(e; fa1; a2g)
de
  C 02(e)
But from M1's rst order condition, it could be

@R(i; e)
@i
+ (1  )dr1(i;A)
di
+ 

@R(i; e)
@e
  dr2(e;B)
de

de
di
  C 01(i) >

@R(i; e)
@i
+ (1  )dr1(i; ;)
di
+ 

@R(i; e)
@e
  dr2(e; fa1; a2g)
de

de
di
  C 01(i)
where (A;B) 2 f(fa1g; fa2g); (fa1; a2g; ;)g. Therefore, we can not say that non-integration or
type 1 integration is dominated by type 2 integration. I.e., all ownership structures could
be optimal under sequential investment even if e is essential.
If both i and e are essential, M1's marginal return from i and M2's marginal return
from e will remain the same for all ownership structures. Therefore, under simultaneous
investment i0 = i1 = i2; e0 = e1 = e2; under sequential investment i0 = i1 = i2; e0 = e1 =
e2.
(vi) If ! 0, under simultaneous investment, the rst order conditions become(
dr1(i;A)
di = C
0
1(i)
@R(i;e)
@e = C
0
2(e)
Clearly, it is better to give all the control rights to M1 to maximize the investment elicited
from M1, since e and ownership structures are independent. The same argument shows
that if ! 1, M2 should have all the control rights.
Under sequential investment, if ! 0, the argument above also applies and M1 should
have all the control rights. The story changes a little if  ! 1, due to the encouragement
eect. In this case, the rst order conditions become(
@R(i;e)
@i +
h
@R(i;e)
@e   dr2(e;B)de
i
de
di = C
0
1(i)
dr2(e;B)
de = C
0
2(e)
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Note, here dedi = 0. Therefore, i and ownership structures are independent. M2 should have
all the control rights.
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